China
OCT 2025
[16/10/2025] UK Security Under Strain: MI5 Warnings, State-Linked Threats, and China’s Response
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on an Arabic news programme and featured Philip Ingram, a former British military intelligence officer, and Marvin Lee, a researcher on Chinese affairs at the University of Manchester, discussing rising UK security threats from Russia, Iran, and China following remarks by MI5 Director-General Ken McCallum. The programme explored alleged espionage, cyber operations, and influence activities, alongside the implications for UK–China relations and broader geopolitical competition.
The discussion covered the reported 35% rise in UK security investigations, MI5’s claims of Russian espionage plots disrupted, over 20 Iran-linked plots that could have caused casualties, and Chinese cyber-espionage, academic influence, and harassment of dissidents. Ingram argued that the threat types are longstanding but intensifying, with China adopting a more proactive posture across Europe and the US and pursuing long-term economic-strategic gains. He highlighted cyber theft of intellectual property, faster product roll-outs, and alignment with Belt and Road networks as compounding factors, alongside China’s leverage over rare earths and data analytics/quantum computing. The segment also addressed UK coordination with EU partners and Five Eyes, contrasting Western electoral time horizons with China’s generational planning and framing the landscape as a competitive geo-economic environment rather than merely traditional espionage.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that heightened tensions reflect great-power competition in a new phase of cyber, legal, and technological rivalry, not solely unilateral Chinese aggression. In a measured, analytical tone, he stresses China’s openness to cooperation, citing deep educational and economic links (e.g., large numbers of Chinese students in the UK) and ongoing UK–China trade engagement, while arguing that both sides conduct cyber operations and that “threat” labels can become bargaining tools in statecraft. Drawing on a Chinese strategic lens—long-term planning, sovereignty, and stability—Lee frames Belt and Road partnerships (with the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa) and technology development (e.g., 5G, AI) as legitimate instruments of national development rather than inherent security threats. He concludes that London will likely seek balanced engagement—pursuing human-rights and cyber concerns while preserving economic and social cooperation—and that China will resist securitised narratives that touch its core interests, preferring incremental, interest-based dialogue consistent with a Confucian emphasis on order and calibrated reciprocity.
[20/10/2025] China’s Growth Slowdown and Targeted Stimulus: Balancing Recovery, Reform, and Confidence
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Q News and featured Marvin Lee, geopolitical analyst and PhD researcher at the University of Manchester, discussing **China’s Q3 growth slowdown to 4.8%, the property slump, and the policy mix Beijing is deploying to stabilise demand while containing debt. The programme explored whether near-term stimulus can deliver the around 5% full-year growth target and what structural reforms are needed to restore confidence.
The discussion covered “targeted stimulus” rather than a broad liquidity surge, prioritising completion of unfinished housing, easing mortgage rates on first homes, and expanding “white-list” lending toward workable projects such as EVs and AI, alongside consumer trade-in subsidies and green/advanced-manufacturing investment. It noted that debt risks are being rebalanced—with more central-government borrowing and reduced local-government leverage—to keep overall public-debt-to-GDP relatively contained while supporting recovery. On confidence, the segment stressed that rate cuts, RRR reductions, and subsidies can steady growth, but durable sentiment requires legal predictability, fair competition with state firms, transparent property policy, tax and cost-of-living reforms, labour-mobility upgrades, and a stronger social safety net. With Q1–Q3 growth around 5.2% and Q3 at 4.8%, hitting ~5% for the year was described as “achievable but with a thin margin.” The conversation also examined consumption’s 53.5% contribution to GDP, warning that a soft job market limits sustainability, and assessed whether trade-in programmes can shift from a one-off boost to lasting industrial upgrading.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that Beijing will stick to precise, confidence-friendly tools—finishing homes, cheaper first-home mortgages, directed credit via white-lists, and green/hi-tech investment—while centralising debt to avoid another leverage cycle, keeping headline debt levels below many G7 peers. He argues that stimulus is only a bridge: true confidence rests on structural reform—stronger legal certainty for private firms (e.g., Huawei, BYD), fair market access versus SOEs, clearer property-policy rules, tax/cost reforms, hukou-style labour-mobility easing, and better social insurance—reflecting a Chinese, long-horizon policy logic that favours order, prudence, and gradualism. On growth, he judges ~5% as still within reach but not guaranteed, framing any shortfall as “controlled deceleration, not crisis,” with a strategic pivot from property-led growth to innovation and domestic demand. He is cautious on relying solely on consumption given labour-market strains and the K-visa-driven competition, and therefore backs inbound-tourism promotion to import demand into China (e.g., “travel to China” trend). On trade-ins, he sees a virtuous cycle—replacing legacy goods with NEVs, smart appliances, and energy-saving equipment—but says it becomes durable only with affordable consumer credit, stable jobs, and ongoing green/high-tech incentives, aligning with a Confucian-tinged emphasis on steady upgrading over headline stimulus.
[30/10/2025] US China Dialogue Shifts from Trade Confrontation to Strategic Balancing over Technology and Global Influence
Alan Tang
The interview aired on an Arabic-language news channel in the programme “ملف اليوم” and featured Alan Tang, a Beijing-based researcher in international politics and economics, and Dr. Steven Turner, a political economy expert from Virginia, United States. The discussion focused on the outcomes of the recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, examining whether the talks marked the end of the trade war or a temporary easing of tensions. The programme also referred to analyses from The Guardian, highlighting the shift of the trade conflict into a geopolitical contest for dominance, and Global Times, which reported on mutual tariff reductions and extended exemptions following the bilateral talks in Kuala Lumpur.
The discussion explored the evolving dynamics of U.S.–China relations, particularly the balance between trade de-escalation and strategic rivalry. It examined Washington’s dual objective of protecting domestic industries and securing high-tech sectors vital to national security, while Beijing seeks to safeguard its growth and autonomy. The guests discussed U.S. efforts to engage China in restraining Russia’s influence, especially in light of BRICS expansion and the war in Ukraine, and the potential for military and economic coordination. Other key issues included tariff suspensions, the role of semiconductors, and the implications of China’s large U.S. dollar reserves. Dr. Turner argued that China’s control of critical minerals gives it leverage, while U.S. political divisions limit the scope of technological concessions. Both guests agreed that China’s extensive holdings of U.S. currency make the introduction of a BRICS currency unlikely and that pressuring China to reduce Russian oil imports may have limited effect on Beijing–Moscow relations.
Alan Tang’s viewpoint is that the U.S.–China rapprochement represents tactical de-escalation rather than lasting reconciliation. He explained that Washington’s decision to delay tariffs and re-establish dialogue channels reflects an attempt to moderate competition and enlist Chinese cooperation regarding Russia and global stability. From a Chinese strategic perspective, Tang underscored a Confucian-style emphasis on balance, self-reliance, and gradual reform, suggesting that China will continue investing in innovation and internal development rather than depend on U.S. technology. He observed that China’s economy is maintaining steady growth of around 5 percent, indicating resilience despite external pressure. On the question of a BRICS currency, Tang noted that China’s heavy dollar reserves discourage rapid monetary shifts, preferring incremental adjustment. Regarding Taiwan’s semiconductor role, he highlighted the necessity of moderation and international mediation to prevent escalation in the chip supply chain. Tang concluded that the current phase is one of managed competition, where China prioritises technological sovereignty, economic stability, and pragmatic engagement to preserve long-term strategic equilibrium.
Sept 2025
[01/09/2025] China’s Vision for Multipolar Cooperation: Insights from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit
Marvin Lee
The interview, aired on Alghad TV, featured Dr Vincent Ligorio, a researcher at Analytica Intelligence in Moscow, and Dr Marvin Lee, a political economy researcher from Hong Kong. It focused on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit and its significance in shaping a new multipolar world order led by China and Russia. The discussion examined how the SCO aims to promote regional unity, economic cooperation, and collective self-reliance as an alternative framework to Western-led alliances such as NATO.
The conversation centred on President Xi Jinping’s remarks about confronting “Cold War mentalities,” which both guests interpreted as a message to the West—especially Washington—urging dialogue over confrontation. The programme explored how the SCO’s member states, representing nearly 40% of the global population, can strengthen integration and economic collaboration. It also discussed Russia’s desire to rebuild influence despite Western sanctions and how China’s Belt and Road Initiative supports the SCO’s mission by deepening trade, infrastructure, and investment links across Asia and the Middle East.
Dr Marvin Lee emphasised that China views the SCO not as a military bloc but as a platform for inclusive economic cooperation and sustainable growth. He argued that Beijing’s goal is balance rather than rivalry, focusing on building strong regional networks while welcoming engagement with Western countries. Dr Lee highlighted China’s commitment to shared prosperity and long-term stability through economic development and mutual respect. He also noted the increasing importance of Middle Eastern partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in China’s broader vision for energy cooperation and strategic connectivity under the Belt and Road framework.
[02/09/2025] Building a Multipolar Future: China’s SCO Strategy for Economic Integration and Global Balance
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Q News in the programme Think Tank and featured Mr Justin Thomas Russell, executive director at a global foreign policy centre in Washington, and Mr Marvin Lee, a Hong Kong based geopolitical analyst specialising in Asia Pacific affairs. The main theme was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin and whether China can turn perceived US uncertainty into a durable coalition by advancing economic integration, multipolar governance, and a ceasefire call on Gaza.
The discussion reviewed President Xi Jinping’s message of resisting unilateral measures, elevating trade integration, and positioning the SCO as a platform that complements rather than mirrors Western led institutions. Topics included the proposed SCO development bank, talk of local currency lending, access to Chinese navigation systems, and the idea of standard setting across energy, logistics, and digital infrastructure. Russell argued that US tariffs and an isolationist posture are pushing partners toward alternative groupings, while also warning about perceived risks in Chinese development finance.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the SCO is not a military bloc but an economic and governance platform designed to stabilise cooperation and reduce reliance on any single power centre. He frames the proposed development bank and local currency settlement as practical tools to de risk projects from sanctions and dollar funding shocks, and sees standard setting and connectivity as the real long term leverage. He argues that smaller entrants like Laos, Armenia, and Azerbaijan matter because of geography and conflict de escalation potential, that the bloc’s focus should be finance, standards, and steady security cooperation, and that China seeks balance and peace through development while remaining open to engagement with the West.
[03/09/2025] Peace Through Strength: China’s Military Parade and the Message of Stability in a Changing World
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on an Arabic news channel and featured Mr Marvin Lee, researcher in Chinese affairs at the University of Manchester, and Dr Gamal Salama, professor of International Relations and dean of the Faculty of Politics and Economics at Suez University. The main theme was China’s unprecedented military parade, which showcased elements of the nuclear triad and the country’s most advanced weapons systems across land, sea, and air. The discussion explored how this display was both a symbol of deterrence and a message of peace, underlining China’s goal of maintaining stability while defending its sovereignty.
The conversation examined President Xi Jinping’s commemoration of the victory in World War II, the debut of the DF 61 intercontinental missile, unmanned undersea vehicles, YJ 17 hypersonic systems, and the J 35 stealth fighter, all of which signal China’s technological advancement and readiness. Dr Salama interpreted the parade as a declaration that China has become a critical military and economic power, able to deter threats and assert itself in issues such as Taiwan. He added that China’s dual emphasis on economic and military strength demonstrates its intent to project influence globally, particularly in response to US strategic containment and Western sanctions.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the parade’s message was fundamentally one of peace through strength. He stressed that China, as a civilisation that values harmony, strengthens its military not to provoke conflict but to safeguard peace, economic growth, and national dignity. Drawing from China’s historical experiences of humiliation, he argued that a strong army protects prosperity and sovereignty, especially amid today’s volatile geopolitical climate. Lee highlighted China’s role as a leading partner in the Belt and Road Initiative, citing deepening ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt as examples of Beijing’s focus on economic cooperation over military intervention. He concluded that China seeks to build bridges of development, using deterrence purely as a stabilising force within an evolving world order.
[05/09/2025] Emerging China Russia North Korea Triangle Challenges Western Led Order
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on the current affairs programme Think Tank, hosted by Henny S, and featured Ginger Chapman and Benny Kwok, discussing the geopolitical significance of the Beijing military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the perceived emerging axis among China, Russia, and North Korea. The programme explored how this high-profile event, showcasing China’s advanced military capabilities and redesigned nuclear triad, signals a potential realignment of global power, with implications for US dominance, Western alliances, and the broader international order.
The discussion covered the symbolism and substance of the Beijing parade, where Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un appeared together amid hypersonic missiles, drones, and other advanced systems, widely interpreted as a public display of solidarity among three heavily sanctioned states. Chapman argued that US sanctions and an inconsistent, “might makes right” approach to trade and security are driving rivals into closer partnership, reinforcing initiatives such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Belt and Road Initiative, and alternative financial systems like CIPS as counterweights to Western-led frameworks such as SWIFT, NATO, and the US-centred order. She highlighted Europe’s economic stagnation, deindustrialisation, and energy vulnerabilities, contrasting this with growth and infrastructure investment across parts of Asia and the Global South, and warned that US and European policies are unintentionally accelerating a pivot from West to East. The conversation also addressed North Korea’s evolving role, currently seen as a tactical but significant ally, especially in the context of missile capabilities and the wider Russia–Ukraine conflict, and raised concerns about the erosion of Western influence as alternative trade corridors, energy routes, and security arrangements take shape.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that China is consciously using this parade and related diplomatic platforms to signal a formalised alternative global system rather than merely a loose, interest-based coalition. He argues that China has moved from integration into the Western-led order to constructing a parallel, state-led economic and political system, leveraging its population size, industrial capacity, control over critical raw materials, and centrality in global supply chains to shape diplomatic behaviour, especially across the Global South. Kwok stresses that Beijing first deepens economic ties and dependency—through trade, investment, loans, and platforms like BRICS and the SCO—and then uses this economic leverage to influence other states’ strategic choices without overt military coercion, encouraging them to align with Chinese interests or at least avoid policies that antagonise China. In his analysis, the military parade formally announces China’s intention to act as a “rule-writer” for an alternative order, inviting countries dissatisfied with US and European policies, particularly in Africa and Latin America, to join a China-led framework that presents itself as more respectful, predictable, and “rules-based” than what he characterises as US unilateralism. He concludes that China will likely expand its network of China-led institutions and frameworks, using them to project influence, challenge Western normative dominance, and consolidate a long-term geopolitical and economic alliance structure centred on Beijing.
[08/09/2025] The SCO and China’s Peace Through Strength Strategy: Balancing Security, Development, and Middle East Diplomacy
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on A News in the programme Türkiye’s Diplomacy and featured Marvin Lee, a Hong Kong based analyst from the Geoshock Think Tank, and Dr Abdul Nurumi from Paris. The main theme was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin and how it intersects with China’s recent military parade, regional security dynamics, and unfolding events in the Middle East, including the deepening crisis in Gaza and related developments such as ceasefire proposals and attacks linked to the Red Sea theatre.
The discussion assessed the SCO’s effectiveness across security cooperation, economic integration, and counter-terrorism, noting proposed initiatives and leader-level engagements among China, Russia, and India. It also examined US reactions to the SCO and China’s parade, Europe and Middle Eastern states’ growing economic ties with China, and live updates on Gaza — from casualties and displacement to ceasefire mediation efforts and regional spillovers such as drone incidents and airport disruptions. Throughout, the programme framed the SCO as a potential platform for multipolar coordination while acknowledging intra-member rivalries and implementation challenges.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the SCO should be judged by its long-term strategic architecture, not short-term deals. He highlights three pillars: joint exercises and information-based operations that build real combat readiness; tight alignment with the Belt and Road Initiative, prioritising security to de-risk infrastructure corridors; and flexible diplomacy among Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi to reduce friction and concentrate on priority theatres. He advances a “peace through strength” reading of China’s posture, arguing that standard setting, local-currency finance, and connectivity are the practical levers of influence; that partners in Europe and the Middle East are deepening ties out of economic pragmatism; and that China prefers economic cooperation over military entanglement, while remaining prepared to deter and manage tensions.
[11/09/2025] ECB–PBOC Swap Line Signals Ongoing Pragmatism in EU–China Economic Relations
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an unnamed TV channel and featured Benny Kwok discussing the extension of the €45 billion liquidity swap line between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). The programme examined the broader implications of this arrangement for Eurozone financial stability, EU–China trade relations, and China’s currency internationalisation strategy.
The discussion explored the economic interdependence between the EU and China, noting that despite political frictions—particularly over the Russia–Ukraine war—both sides maintain substantial trade and investment links. The interview highlighted concerns around capital controls in China, liquidity access for foreign firms, and geopolitical uncertainty, while also considering how the swap line may mitigate financial risks and support cross-border business activity. Broader themes included Europe’s exposure to geopolitical tensions, the limits of EU leverage over China’s Russia policy, and China’s long-term push to expand the use of the renminbi (RMB).
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that the extension of the ECB–PBOC swap line reflects a stable and pragmatic economic partnership, even as both sides navigate strategic disagreements. He emphasised that China’s strict capital controls create uncertainties for foreign businesses, and that the swap line provides important liquidity assurance, allowing European and Chinese firms to manage RMB-euro flows more reliably. He noted that EU–China relations will remain neither fully harmonious nor severely deteriorated, as both actors rely on each other economically and seek to hedge against wider geopolitical risks, including uncertainties surrounding the United States. Kwok framed the issue through a strategic and pragmatic lens, describing China’s approach—consistent with long-term, incremental thinking—as focused on renminbi internationalisation, using tools such as currency swaps and the CIPS settlement system to reduce reliance on the US dollar. He concluded that despite political tensions, economic cooperation will continue to be sustained by mutual necessity and pragmatic calculation.
[12/09/2025] UK–China Dual-Use Trade Agreement: Balancing Security, Innovation, and Economic Engagement
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Q News in the Economic Bulletin and featured Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst and PhD researcher at the University of Manchester. The main theme was the UK–China agreement to simplify trade in compliant dual-use items, with a focus on which UK sectors stand to benefit, how Chinese import and investment pledges could translate into outcomes, and what the agreement means amid broader geopolitical sensitivities involving the US and its allies.
The discussion covered expected gains for advanced manufacturing and precision engineering, life sciences including AI-enabled drug discovery, and green and new-energy technologies such as EVs and solar. It examined how Chinese commitments to expand imports and encourage investment might materialise through demand for high-end equipment, education and healthcare services, and through capital directed to 5G, AI, big data, and digital infrastructure. The host also raised concerns about controversy around dual-use cooperation; the conversation situated the UK approach as balancing security alignment with pragmatic engagement, while noting China’s push to grow its services trade, deploy soft power via events and tourism, and sustain development through higher fiscal capacity during the 14th Five-Year Plan. The segment closed with policy levers to spur private investment, including fair market access, financing tools such as guarantees and bond channels, and legal protections, with Hong Kong highlighted as a venue for cross-border commercial dispute resolution.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the agreement re-establishes a workable security boundary for sensitive technology, restoring predictability for supply chains and enabling targeted industrial cooperation despite political headwinds. He argues UK gains are most likely in manufacturing/precision instruments, life sciences, and green tech, provided there is transparency on negative lists, mutual recognition of standards, and regulatory sandboxes to cut duplicate testing. On geopolitics, he frames London’s stance as hedging diplomacy — maintaining US security alignment while engaging China economically. He links China’s services-and-soft-power push to a longer transition up the value chain, and contends that stronger public finances position Beijing to fund innovation and welfare. To crowd-in private capital, he emphasises equal procurement access, diversified financing routes, streamlined approvals, and robust IP and case-law enforcement, with Hong Kong’s emerging mediation architecture supporting more reliable UK–China commercial ties.
[15/09/2025] Madrid Talks US China and Cairo Mediation on Iran
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Al Qahera News and featured Justin Thomas Russell (global foreign policy centre executive director, Florida), Dr Marvin Lee (political economy researcher, Hong Kong), Dr Ahmed Lashin (professor of Iranian studies, Cairo) and Dr Mehrdad Khonsari (former Iranian diplomat, London). The main theme was the opening day of US–China economic talks in Madrid, covering trade, technology and national security— including the fate of TikTok—followed by a second segment on Iran’s understandings with the IAEA brokered in Cairo and what they imply for inspections, sanctions and regional diplomacy.
The discussion framed Madrid as a neutral venue to cool tensions and restore predictability to supply chains while acknowledging unresolved structural frictions such as semiconductors. Russell argued tariff escalation would rebound on US consumers yet also pressure China, making negotiated outcomes economically necessary for both sides. The programme then turned to Iran, highlighting Egypt’s role in facilitating IAEA access arrangements, Tehran’s bid to avert snapback sanctions, and the domestic constraints Iranian leaders face in justifying concessions. Guests stressed that Cairo’s mediation provides a credible bridge with Europe and the United States, even as verification questions, timelines and political sensitivities remain tight.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that Beijing’s approach is pragmatic and incremental: widen trade channels, stabilise logistics ahead of political deadlines, and accept that strategic technology frictions will persist. He was cautious about near-term breakthroughs, expecting possible additional US tariffs while noting China’s diversification of exports toward Central Asia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, supported by improving financial conditions in Hong Kong and the mainland. More broadly, he framed China’s stance as business first, dialogue preferred, with contingency via BRICS and SCO partnerships if talks stall—arguing that long-term stability depends on de-risking projects, expanding market access and preventing political competition from overwhelming economic cooperation.
[19/09/2025] Renewed Dialogue Between the US and China
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Q News in the programme In-Depth and featured Peter Tannis, chairman of Lynx Investment Advisory in Washington, and Marvin Lee, a Hong Kong based geopolitical analyst. The main theme was the apparent thaw in US–China relations following a framework understanding to keep TikTok operating in the United States, and whether this momentum can translate into durable cooperation on tariffs, export controls, rare earths, and supply-chain stability.
The discussion set out a two-track process: a near-term deal on TikTok, and a broader, harder agenda spanning semiconductors, agriculture, rare earths, and trade balances. Tannis argued Washington faces domestic pressures around inflation and employment, making tariff relief and predictable imports economically attractive, while Beijing wields leverage via managed exports of rare earths and selective curbs on US farm goods. Both guests noted the political timing—an upcoming Trump–Xi summit under preparation and election-season incentives—alongside risks that enforcement disputes or security concerns could derail progress. The programme highlighted third-country roles as supply chains tilt toward Vietnam, Malaysia, and Mexico, and the signaling effect of any quiet tariff adjustments, licensing approvals, or joint statements moving from “managing differences” to “expanding cooperation.”
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that Beijing is pursuing controlled openness and pragmatic, incremental steps—stabilising the domestic economy and logistics while engaging externally to manage risk. He frames the reopening as driven by growth priorities and the desire to reduce simultaneous flashpoints, with clear red lines on core tech know-how, sovereignty issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, and strategic resources. Lee expects measurable but modest moves—licences granted, code and compliance rules clarified, pilot openings in targeted sectors—paired with continued diversification toward Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia and fallback coordination through BRICS and the SCO. In his reading, success will be evident in actions rather than rhetoric: lower frictions in trade data, resumed joint ventures, and concrete regulatory steps that keep rivalry below the threshold of open confrontation.
[21/09/2025] China’s Response to U.S. Moves on Taiwan
Marvin Lee
The clip featured Dr Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst, addressing how Beijing perceives recent U.S. steps toward Taiwan. He characterised Beijing’s read as cautious but strategic: Chinese leaders see the U.S. action as an escalation that can be framed domestically and internationally to strengthen China’s central role. Lee said the response will combine diplomatic outreach and practical cooperation (including trade and broader engagement) to reduce friction, while simultaneously maintaining robust military readiness and continuing exercises so that China is “prepared for war to preserve peace.” He emphasised Beijing’s willingness to engage in dialogue but only on terms that respect Chinese sovereignty.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China will pursue a dual track of “peace through strength”: expand peaceful cooperation and narratives to win influence and reduce disputes, yet explicitly retain and display military deterrence to protect core interests. He expects Beijing to use the episode to bolster its global standing and leverage—through media, trade, and diplomatic channels—while warning that Washington will remain wary. Lee frames China’s posture as defensive rather than aggressive: seeking stability and dialogue but ready to respond firmly if provoked, grounded in historical lessons about national security and dignity.
[22/09/2025] Asia’s Economic Integration and China’s Role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Q News and featured Marvin Lee, a geopolitical and economic analyst, discussing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and its projected impact on trade, investment, and economic coordination across Asia. The main theme was how the world’s largest trade bloc could deepen supply-chain integration, promote digital and green industries, and position Asia as the global centre of growth through pragmatic cooperation and inclusive development.
The discussion explored sectoral opportunities in electronics, semiconductors, renewable energy equipment, and e-commerce, highlighting that China, South Korea, and ASEAN economies already account for over half of global electronics exports. Lee explained that reducing non-tariff barriers—such as customs delays and inconsistent standards—could cut clearance times by up to 40%, save businesses billions annually, and reinforce China’s dual circulation strategy, which balances domestic demand with external trade. He cited World Bank estimates that RCEP expansion could boost intra-bloc trade by up to 7% within five years, while UN data suggests intra-Asian FDI could rise by 15% by 2035 as investors seek predictable and harmonised environments. Smaller economies like Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos stand to gain significantly, provided mechanisms such as capacity building, technology transfer, and special treatment provisions prevent a two-speed economy.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that RCEP’s success depends on pragmatic inclusivity and Confucian harmony—balancing growth with fairness and cooperation. He emphasised that new members should meet three criteria: commitment to tariff liberalisation, digital trade readiness, and supply-chain integration capacity. Lee framed competition as a catalyst for innovation, particularly in green technologies and smart manufacturing, aligning with China’s Made in China 2025 strategy. He also cautioned that while deeper integration can lower inflation and transaction costs, cultural and policy diversity will challenge monetary coordination across over two billion people. Ultimately, he argued that RCEP’s true value lies in creating balanced interdependence, where economic prosperity is shared, harmony maintained, and Asia firmly established as the gravitational centre of global economic growth.
Aug 2025
[05/08/2025] China’s Strategic Adaptation to US Tariffs and Trade Pressures
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Al Qahera News and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a political economy expert from Hong Kong, discussing China’s resilience against ongoing US tariffs and its broader strategy to redirect trade and investment amid the continuing trade war. The programme examined how Beijing has managed to sustain export growth, maintain a trade surplus, and strengthen its role in emerging markets despite intensified economic pressures from Washington.
The discussion explored China’s multi-layered response to the US tariff regime, highlighting how it views the trade war not as a threat but as an opportunity to diversify and innovate. Dr Lee explained that China has achieved a trade surplus of around 1.3 percent of GDP, supported by diversified supply chains and new markets across ASEAN, Latin America, and the Middle East. The conversation also noted the role of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in expanding China’s global reach, particularly in sectors such as artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, and global services. The host further raised the issue of declining exports to the US—down by 10.9 percent as of June 2025—and asked how China has sustained its overall trade strength.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China’s economic resilience stems from structural diversification, strategic diplomacy, and the soft power of integration rather than confrontation. He emphasised that Beijing has shifted its focus toward emerging markets in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, with countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt becoming key trade partners in sectors such as electric vehicles and high-tech machinery. Lee added that over 5,000 American companies, including major firms like Apple, still operate in China, underscoring the global economy’s interdependence and how disruptions to Chinese markets would ultimately harm the US more than China. He concluded that China’s “reorientation of its export compass” through initiatives like the BRI and the Comprehensive Strategic Regional Partnership reflects its commitment to a multipolar trade order—one built on cooperation with nations seeking alternatives to US dominance. This, he argued, illustrates China’s capacity to leverage economic adaptability and long-term vision to withstand and even benefit from trade tensions.
[15/08/2025] China’s Economic Slowdown and Structural Transformation Amid Global Trade Pressures
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a PhD researcher from the University of Manchester, discussing China’s recent slowdown in retail sales and industrial production, its impact on the 2025 GDP growth targets, and the broader structural challenges facing the Chinese economy. The programme examined weak domestic demand, youth unemployment, and the policy options available to sustain growth while managing long-term financial risks and global trade uncertainties.
The discussion covered the slowdown in key sectors such as property, construction, and consumer goods, with retail sales growth at 3.7 percent year-on-year and property investment declining by 12 percent. Dr Lee highlighted that industries tied to the property chain—including steel, home furnishing, and big-ticket consumer goods—face the greatest pressure due to weak demand and falling margins. The interview also addressed the social impact of China’s 14 percent youth unemployment rate, describing the “lay down effect” where young people disengage from the labour market. The conversation further explored the limitations of fiscal and infrastructure stimulus, the evolving role of the Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s strategy to navigate trade tensions and demographic challenges.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China’s economic challenges are cyclical but also structural, requiring precise policy reform rather than short-term stimulus. He argued that Beijing must focus on upgrading its industrial base through initiatives such as Made in China 2025, shifting from low-cost manufacturing to high-value industries like electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies. Citing a Chinese proverb—“governing a great state is like cooking a small fish, you must not overdo it”—he stressed that economic management must be measured and strategic. Lee added that the government’s long-term focus on diversifying export markets through cooperation with the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia—particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt—reflects China’s adaptation to global trade disruptions. He concluded that China’s resilience will depend on boosting household confidence, sustaining social stability, and gradually transforming into an innovation-driven economy, positioning itself as a mature and adaptive power in the evolving global order.
[17/08/2025] China’s Strategic Leverage amid US–India Tensions and the Prospects for Regional Stability
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a political economy expert from Hong Kong, discussing how escalating tensions between the United States and India under renewed US tariff pressures could reshape China–India relations. The programme explored whether Washington’s confrontational trade approach might inadvertently open diplomatic and economic space for Beijing and New Delhi to stabilise ties and cooperate within broader multilateral frameworks.
The discussion focused on the potential for China to act as a strategic and economic partner amid global trade realignments. Dr Lee noted that bilateral economic engagement between China and India has reached around 130 billion US dollars between 2022 and 2025, with China contributing roughly 99.2 billion dollars in trade and investment facilitation that benefits both sides. He explained that such cooperation offers mutual protection against new US tariffs and sanctions. The interview also highlighted China’s intention to maintain diplomatic stability through ongoing dialogue, including a scheduled bilateral meeting in New Delhi in 2025, which signals both countries’ willingness to preserve communication channels despite historical border frictions.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China seeks to transform regional competition into pragmatic coexistence, leveraging its economic attractiveness and multilateral diplomacy to prevent India from aligning too closely with Washington. He emphasised that initiatives such as BRICS’ push for local currency settlements strengthen both India and China by reducing dependence on the US dollar and reinforcing the idea of a multipolar financial order. Lee further observed that China’s approach reflects a Confucian logic of harmony over confrontation, aiming to expand shared platforms rather than deepen divisions. He concluded that Beijing’s goal is not to dominate but to cultivate stability, unity, and balanced relations, using diplomacy and economic cooperation to ease border tensions and create a resilient framework for long-term regional peace.
[20/08/2025] China’s Toy Market Growth and Cultural Export Strategy
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Mr Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst and PhD researcher at the University of Manchester, discussing the drivers behind the global toy and games market growth and China’s role in shaping that sector. The programme examined how rising demand, cultural soft power, product innovation, and shifting consumption patterns are influencing the trajectory of the industry, especially in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
The discussion began by noting the projected growth of the global toys and games market to USD 132.86 billion in 2025, with a compound annual growth rate of about 2.42 percent. Marvin Lee attributed this to the expansion of the middle class, increasing digitalization, and the convergence of education and entertainment. He argued that toys are evolving into cultural carriers and ambassadors, enabling producers to disseminate narratives and values across borders. He predicted that growth will accelerate, particularly in regions with young demographics and rising consumer power—such as Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East (notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt). When asked why the United States remains the leading consumer base (with an estimated USD 41.7 billion in 2025), Lee pointed to high disposable income, a mature retail infrastructure, and a cultural affinity for novelty. He also framed the US toy market as a stage of cultural competition: just as Hollywood exports American soft power through film, the US exports toy brands; Chinese firms see this as an opportunity to challenge that dominance by combining innovation with deeper cultural resonance.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the shift toward interactive and educational toys reflects deeper cultural values, especially rooted in Confucian traditions that prize learning and self-improvement. He believes that this change is likely permanent: rather than returning to a focus on purely traditional toys, markets will increasingly favour products that integrate play, education, and narrative. Still, he allowed that traditional toys might persist through nostalgia-driven demand. He used Pop Mart’s Labu figurine as a case study, noting how its dramatic revenue surge arises from the fact that such collectibles carry identity, story, and community meaning beyond mere objects. In his view, these products show China’s increasing capacity to export imagination, not just goods. Lee went further to say that blind-box and surprise-element models—once niche—are becoming mainstream and may grow into a dominant segment of the industry. This transition aligns with China’s shift from being a manufacturing hub to a branding and innovation center. He concluded that from a soft-power perspective, these trends allow Chinese companies to reshape consumption models worldwide—just as other entertainment exports once did—and position China as a cultural innovator in global markets.
[21/08/2025] China’s Easing of Export Curbs toward India as a Strategic Diplomatic Recalibration
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst and PhD researcher at the University of Manchester, discussing China’s decision to ease export restrictions on India amid rising US–China tensions and shifting regional alliances. The programme explored whether this move represents a tactical adjustment to global economic pressures or a broader diplomatic overture aimed at stabilising Asia’s geopolitical landscape ahead of upcoming high-level engagements between Beijing and New Delhi.
The discussion addressed how Beijing’s decision aligns with its long-term strategic calculus. Dr Lee explained that China’s relaxation of export curbs reflects a Confucian and Sun Tzu–inspired strategy—avoiding confrontation on multiple fronts while promoting harmony through selective cooperation. He argued that by stabilising trade with India and reducing supply chain frictions, China seeks to position itself as a constructive partner rather than a disruptive force, particularly before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit. The conversation also revisited the lingering effects of the 2020 border conflict, noting that while trust between both countries remains fragile, practical cooperation is resuming due to mutual recognition of economic interdependence and shared regional challenges.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China’s diplomatic easing is both a geopolitical hedge and a message to Washington. He stated that Beijing aims to signal two things: first, that it retains diverse market alternatives beyond the United States; and second, that it remains capable of flexible diplomacy. Lee observed that India’s “hedging diplomacy”—balancing ties with the US, Russia, Japan, and China—mirrors the Confucian “Doctrine of the Mean,” seeking equilibrium rather than extremes. From Beijing’s perspective, the key is not to demand loyalty from New Delhi but to reduce tensions and prevent India from fully aligning with US-led coalitions such as the Quad. He concluded that China and India are using engagement as leverage to advance their respective interests vis-à-vis the United States and Europe, with any progress contingent upon cautious, interest-based diplomacy rather than genuine strategic trust.
[21/08/2025] China Explores Controlled Crypto Adoption Amid US Policy Shifts and Capital Regulation Pressures
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an economic news programme and featured Benny Kwok, a political-economy researcher based in Hong Kong, discussing China’s evolving approach to cryptocurrencies, particularly in light of recent US legislation promoting wider crypto adoption. The programme examined Beijing’s historical resistance to digital currencies, its cautious 2025 re-engagement, and how these moves intersect with capital controls, global monetary competition, and renminbi internationalisation.
The discussion covered China’s 2021 blanket ban on cryptocurrencies, which stemmed from Beijing’s insistence on full traceability and control over capital flows, and contrasted it with today’s gradual reconsideration. The interviewer and Kwok noted that the shift is partly a reaction to President Donald Trump’s recent US crypto-legalisation initiative, which Washington sees as a way to strengthen the dollar’s global dominance. Kwok explained that Hong Kong is being used as an experimental zone, offering a controlled environment where China can observe the behaviour of crypto assets while keeping them outside mainland circulation but still under Chinese regulatory influence. The conversation explored expectations ahead of the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, where China may discuss broader crypto usage, though Kwok emphasised that Beijing faces a fundamental dilemma: expanding crypto adoption contradicts China’s strict capital-control model, raising questions about whether digital assets can be scaled without diluting state oversight. The interview also addressed the renminbi’s weak global share in payments, the risks of loosening controls, and China’s broader search for tools to counterbalance the 47% global dominance of the US dollar.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that China’s crypto signals are largely strategic and reactive rather than a true embrace of decentralised technologies. He argues that while Beijing wants to prevent the US from expanding the dollar’s power through regulated crypto markets, it remains deeply concerned about untraceable capital movements, making widespread cryptocurrency adoption incompatible with China’s political and financial architecture. Kwok stresses that Beijing will continue using Hong Kong as a controlled testing ground, but ultimately sees the CIPS payment system, not cryptocurrencies, as the more realistic path for renminbi expansion in global trade, because CIPS strengthens China’s financial reach without undermining capital controls. He concludes that although China may experiment with digital assets for geopolitical reasons, strict capital-management principles rooted in China’s governance philosophy mean that crypto will not soon become a major pillar of Beijing’s monetary strategy.
[28/08/2025] China’s Push for AI Chip Autonomy Amid a Fragmenting Global Tech Order
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on the Economic Bulletin and featured economic expert Benny Kwok from Hong Kong, discussing China’s efforts to expand its domestic AI chip production, led by Huawei, in response to US export controls. The programme examined how realistic China’s aim to triple AI chip output by 2026 is, given the technical, geopolitical, and supply chain constraints, and explored what this means for the global semiconductor landscape and technology competition.
The discussion covered the limits of China’s current high-end chip capabilities, with Kwok stressing that Chinese-made advanced chips are not yet able to match Nvidia’s AI chips or TSMC’s manufacturing quality, particularly for cutting-edge AI models and large language models. He noted that China already dominates low- and mid-end semiconductor manufacturing, and is likely to progress further on more advanced nodes over several years, but faces constraints in quality, reliability, and access to critical manufacturing equipment. The conversation highlighted how US export controls are accelerating a broader fragmentation of the global tech ecosystem, with one bloc centred on the US and its allies, and another increasingly dependent on Chinese-made components. Within this fragmented environment, China may supply cheaper, lower-performance AI chips to developing countries and smaller firms, giving Beijing greater influence over emerging AI ecosystems in the Global South, even if it lags at the technological frontier. The interview also addressed challenges of scaling up production, including reliance on third-party intermediaries and “black market” channels to obtain restricted equipment and the need for large state subsidies to sustain domestic chip expansion.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that China’s AI chip strategy is both a defensive response to US export controls and a proactive bid to reshape global technology dependencies. He argues that while China cannot yet produce top-tier AI chips comparable to Nvidia’s offerings, it can still leverage its strength in mass manufacturing and cost advantages to become a crucial supplier of more affordable, lower-spec chips to developing economies and smaller technology companies. In his analysis, the geopolitical logic is that by building a parallel, China-centred chip supply chain, Beijing can reduce vulnerability to Western restrictions, increase its bargaining power, and gain a voice in setting standards and practices in AI and advanced technologies, especially across the Global South. He emphasises that this strategy will depend on continued state support, creative use of intermediaries to access advanced tools, and gradual improvements in quality, but concludes that China is likely to secure a significant, if not yet leading, role in the global AI chip ecosystem by combining scale, price competitiveness, and strategic alignment with non-Western partners.
July 2025
[07/07/2025] China’s Expanding Overseas Mining Investments and Strategic Resource Diplomacy
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a geopolitical and economic analyst from Hong Kong, discussing the sharp rise in China’s overseas mining investments during 2024. The programme examined how Beijing’s global resource strategy reflects its ambition to secure long-term access to critical minerals such as lithium, copper, and nickel—materials essential for advanced manufacturing, green technologies, and national security.
The discussion highlighted that China’s acceleration in overseas mining aligns with its long-term industrial policy and global supply chain dominance. Dr Lee explained that Chinese mining groups have concluded deals exceeding USD 100 million in Latin America and Central Asia in 2024 alone, focusing on lithium, copper, and other vital raw materials for industries such as electric vehicles, semiconductors, and aerospace. He argued that this surge represents not only economic expansion but also a strategic response to Western attempts to build alternative supply chains. According to Dr Lee, China currently controls around 60 percent of the world’s lithium and copper refining capacity, largely secured through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). He noted that by forming long-term partnerships in Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia, China now effectively sets global pricing benchmarks and resource flows, while adopting a diplomatic posture that treats Global South partners as equals rather than subordinates.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China’s dominance in the global mining sector reflects a mix of long-term planning, geopolitical foresight, and Confucian diplomacy. He described Beijing’s approach as a “long game,” comparing it to chess—strategic, patient, and focused on balance rather than confrontation. Lee explained that Western hesitation in mining investments has given China a first-mover advantage in shaping the future of the critical minerals market. Despite increasing Western resistance, particularly from countries like Canada and the United States, Chinese firms continue to adapt through diversification and strategic alliances. He cited Zijin Mining’s recent USD 1.02 billion acquisition of a gold mine in Kazakhstan as a timely example of Beijing deepening its foothold in Central Asia amid the Russia–Ukraine conflict and regional energy instability. Lee concluded that China views Central Asia not merely as an economic opportunity but as a cultural and geopolitical bridge, where economic influence can translate into deeper strategic partnerships—solidifying its position as the defining power in the next era of global resource competition.
[09/07/2025] China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and the Pursuit of Social Harmony, Economic Resilience, and Strategic Independence
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst and PhD researcher at the University of Manchester, discussing China’s key achievements under the 14th Five-Year Plan and its evolving economic and diplomatic posture toward the European Union and the wider world. The programme explored how China exceeded its socioeconomic targets through institutional reforms and cultural governance philosophy while maintaining stability amid global uncertainty and geopolitical competition.
The discussion highlighted that China’s progress in urbanization and life expectancy stems from both policy execution and a philosophical approach rooted in Confucian ideals of collective well-being. Dr Lee explained that between 2021 and 2023, China successfully integrated over 22 million rural migrants into urban areas, granting access to public healthcare, education, and housing. Parallel investments in R&D, AI, material science, medicine, and elderly care advanced China’s vision of dignified aging and inclusive prosperity. He emphasized that the plan’s success reflects a governing philosophy where the legitimacy of the state derives from protecting life and ensuring intergenerational harmony.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China’s economic resilience and sustainability under the 14th Five-Year Plan are anchored in “orderly development”—a long-term strategy that combines Legalist planning with Confucian balance. He noted that as of 2024, China’s GDP reached 126 trillion yuan, growing by 5.3 percent, with domestic consumption contributing 82 percent through the dual-circulation model. This model strengthens internal demand while maintaining global engagement, embodying the Chinese maxim: “internal strength leads to external stability.”
Turning to EU–China relations, Lee stated that Beijing seeks harmony in difference—acknowledging ideological divisions while pursuing mutual economic gain. He cited the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as an example of economic leverage disguised as environmental policy, arguing that China views such measures as protectionist rather than fair competition. Ahead of the upcoming EU–China bilateral summit, Lee identified three core points of contention: green technology rivalry, data governance, and politicized trade regulation. He stressed that China perceives European trade barriers as fear of its comparative advantage in EVs, solar exports, and advanced materials rather than genuine regulatory concerns.
Concluding, Dr Lee asserted that China’s capacity to withstand external shocks lies in its deep institutional strength, civilizational continuity, and alliances across the Global South—notably with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and other BRICS partners. He framed China’s long-term strategy as one of unity, adaptability, and peace through strength, emphasizing that the country’s 5,000-year heritage equips it to endure geopolitical pressures while steadily advancing its vision of national rejuvenation and global balance.
[16/07/2025] China’s Second-Quarter Growth Masks Structural Pressures Amid Tariffs and Weak Domestic Demand
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on Q News’ Economic Bulletin and featured Benny Kwok, a Chinese economist based in Hong Kong, discussing China’s 5.3% GDP growth in the second quarter of 2025, slightly above expectations. The programme explored how this performance fits into the broader global climate, including intensifying US tariffs, slowing consumption at home, and China’s attempts to stabilise a fragile property market.
The discussion covered the drivers and limitations of China’s recent growth, with Kwok noting that exporters “rushed out shipments” ahead of new US tariff rounds, inflating short-term data. He highlighted that despite headline growth, property weakness, shrinking household purchasing power, and pressure from US and EU trade measures continue to weigh heavily on the economy. The conversation also examined the sectoral breakdown, with the services sector slightly outperforming industry, signalling Beijing’s continued reliance on exports, services expansion, and external demand rather than deep structural reforms. Kwok stressed that authorities are using a mix of stimulus measures, including property-market support, demographic incentives, and export expansion into the Global South, but warned that these approaches prolong rather than resolve underlying imbalances. He also noted that foreign and domestic firms are gradually shifting production to Southeast Asia, a trend that could increase unemployment and strain local labour markets.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that while the 5.3% figure provides short-term reassurance, it should not be seen as a sign of sustained strength. His analysis emphasised that China’s growth model remains highly export-dependent, and that structural reforms—particularly in the property sector, governance, and household income—are politically difficult and therefore slow-moving. He argued that Beijing’s macro policies have stabilised the economy only temporarily, and that expanding exports to regions such as Brazil, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia is a strategic attempt to offset tariff-related losses in the West. Kwok also stressed that the true impact of US tariffs will intensify gradually, as more Chinese and foreign firms relocate or split operations abroad, effects not fully captured in official data. He concluded that China remains vulnerable to external shocks, and that Beijing’s strategy of postponing structural adjustments will prolong pressures on domestic demand and labour markets even as headline growth appears stable.
[24/07/2025] US–China Tariff Talks Reflect Deeper Strategic Tensions Over Supply Chains, Energy, and Market Access
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an economic news programme and featured Benny Kwok, discussing the upcoming US–China talks in Sweden, centred on whether Washington will extend the August 12 tariff deadline. The programme explored how this deadline connects to broader trade, geopolitical, and energy disputes, including US concerns about Chinese overcapacity, China’s oil purchases from sanctioned states, and the EU’s desire to address structural trade imbalances with Beijing.
The discussion covered the likely short-term extension of the US tariff deadline, which Kwok described as a symbolic gesture allowing Washington to signal openness to negotiation. He stressed, however, that the real context extends beyond bilateral US–China tariffs to include Washington’s new trade arrangements with Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, particularly the trans-shipment penalties designed to curb Chinese supply-chain rerouting. Kwok highlighted that the US is also attempting to pressure China over its oil imports from Iran, while simultaneously pursuing secondary sanctions that could target Chinese entities. He noted that the United States is gradually trying to shift manufacturing out of China and into Southeast Asia, though such a transformation would unfold over “ten to twenty years or more.” The conversation also touched on Europe’s priorities, with the EU seeking ways to manage Chinese manufacturing overcapacity, protect its markets, and preserve access to China without destabilising the broader relationship.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that the tariff negotiations are shaped less by narrow trade concerns and more by strategic testing between the two powers, especially over China’s willingness to continue supporting Iran economically and potentially militarily. He argued that the US will use the Sweden meeting to gauge how far China is prepared to go in backing Iran, while simultaneously deploying trade tools to contain China’s industrial strength and restrict links between China and Southeast Asian producers. He framed China’s response as pragmatic but firm, noting that Beijing will continue supporting Iran while seeking to maintain stable ties with Europe. From a broader geopolitical logic, Kwok emphasised that China will try to diversify export markets toward the Global South to ease pressure from Western tariffs and overcapacity disputes. He concluded that both China and the EU will preserve pragmatic relations, but structural tensions over market access, subsidies, and excess capacity will remain central to future negotiations.
[28/07/2025] China’s Strategic Patience amid the Renewed US Tariff Deadline
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Al Ekhbariya TV and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a political economy researcher, discussing China’s preparations and strategic approach ahead of the 2 August deadline to reach a new trade agreement with the United States. The programme examined whether Beijing would concede to Washington’s demands or instead maintain its long-term policy of strategic patience, as tariff levels risk tripling and escalating into a full-scale bilateral trade freeze.
The discussion focused on Beijing’s measured and historically informed strategy. Dr Lee explained that China does not view the 2 August deadline as a fixed point of pressure but rather as a temporary phase in a longer negotiation cycle. Drawing parallels with the 2019 trade war talks, he noted that Beijing refrained from making unilateral concessions then and is likely to do the same now, prioritizing the rebalancing of global trade structures over short-term compromise. He described China’s current posture as one of calculated waiting, aimed at ensuring that any eventual deal is mutually satisfactory and strategically advantageous rather than reactive.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that a potential 90-day extension of the truce—reported by the South China Morning Post—would serve as a tactical manoeuvre by Beijing. Such an extension would allow China to reassess its economic alignment not only with the United States but also with key BRICS partners such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar, reflecting a broader diversification of global trade relations. Lee emphasised that this approach fits within Beijing’s long-term diplomatic logic of multi-alignment and global partnership building, designed to strengthen its leverage in international negotiations. While the conversation briefly compared the US–EU tariff framework of 15 percent as a possible precedent for moderating US–China trade tensions, Dr Lee maintained that China’s decisions will remain rooted in strategic evaluation rather than external pressure, balancing resilience, pragmatism, and long-term geopolitical positioning.
June 2025
[02/06/2025] US China rivalry debate from military flashpoints to economic coercion
Marvin Lee
The interview hosted a debate between Marvin Lee, a Hong Kong–based political analyst, and Robert Arlett, a US Republican political figure in Washington, on the evolving US–China political-trade confrontation. The discussion opened with Beijing’s warnings after remarks by US Defense figure Pete Hegseth, which China reads as escalatory and tied to Indo-Pacific military arrangements (e.g., AUKUS-style cooperation). Both guests framed Taiwan as the hottest flashpoint, with broader stakes across technology, tariffs, and alliance politics.
Robert Arlett’s position is that under President Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth, Washington will “not tolerate” perceived Chinese aggression—military or economic. He argues the US can combine tariffs, coordinated pressure with allies, and punitive measures to deter geographic expansion and uphold partners like Taiwan, while reserving force as a last resort. Arlett contends US market power and military strength give Washington decisive leverage, and he questions Chinese intentions, even alleging security risks from some Chinese students—claims he links to a tougher “America First” security posture.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that Beijing sees US moves as Cold War-style containment, and responds with a dual message: diplomatic flexibility but military readiness—“peace through preparedness.” He stresses that Chinese statements target two audiences: domestically, to signal resolve and calm; externally, to reassure partners in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that China offers economic alternatives and strategic autonomy. On Taiwan, Lee says “one China” is a non-negotiable sovereignty issue, doubts US willingness to fight (citing Ukraine as a cautionary precedent), and argues sanctions are blunt and ineffective, pushing China toward self-reliance (from space stations to navigation systems). He allows for tactical cooperation with Europe where interests align but emphasizes long-game, diversified partnerships and gradual, flexible diplomacy.
The exchange closed on who “loses” in a prolonged cold-war economic contest. Arlett says China needs US consumers more than the US needs China, implying Beijing would blink first. Lee counters that sanctions rarely break states, and that China will adapt, rebuild, and reroute supply chains, making coercion costly and inconclusive while keeping channels for dialogue and de-escalation open.
[06/06/2025] China, Russia, Iran and Ukraine: Geopolitical Crises Turned into Tools of Strategic Leverage
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on Q News’ in-depth current affairs programme and featured Ramir Khalyubi, a high school economics lecturer in Moscow, and Benny Kwok, an international politics expert from Hong Kong. They discussed how China and Russia are using the Iranian nuclear file and the Ukrainian conflict as instruments of geopolitical leverage rather than purely issues to be resolved. The programme examined how Beijing and Moscow’s coordination is reshaping alliances, challenging Western influence, and blurring the line between negotiation and strategic manoeuvring, with particular focus on China’s role in Ukraine and Iran, and its increasingly complex relationship with the United States under Donald Trump.
The discussion covered Russia’s use of the Iranian nuclear file to position itself as an indispensable broker, extracting concessions and challenging US and Western unity, while maintaining Iran as a partner rather than a formal ally. Khalyubi emphasised that Russia–China ties are cooperative but not without sensitivities, as Moscow also explores re-engagement with Washington and retains its own agenda in the Middle East. Both guests noted that China has demonstrated growing political weight, for example by mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and by presenting a peace framework for the Russia–Ukraine war, even if it remains militarily neutral in form and viewed with suspicion in the West. The programme also highlighted trilateral military exercises between China, Russia and Iran in the Persian Gulf, which Kwok described as a symbolic show of an anti-US alignment, and explored how Trump’s shifting policies on trade, tariffs and critical minerals feed into a wider contest over strategic sectors such as EVs, AI and semiconductors. Overall, the conversation framed contentious crises as “chess pieces” in a new diplomatic game, where major powers seek leverage rather than rapid resolution.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that Beijing’s engagement in Ukraine and Iran is driven by strategic calculation, not altruistic mediation. On Ukraine, he argues that China was initially in an “embarrassed position” because Russia’s invasion violated Beijing’s long-stated principle of sovereignty, yet China had little choice but to side with Russia in order to counterbalance the United States. He contends that the war has become a “golden chance” for China to expand influence in Central Asia, exploiting the shrinking Russian role to deepen economic partnerships with countries such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and to rebalance the China–Russia relationship so that Moscow is increasingly dependent on Chinese financial and economic support. On Iran, Kwok stresses that China is now the most important buyer of Iranian oil and a key economic partner, using this relationship as a stepping stone to advance its broader Middle East interests, while simultaneously strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other regional actors. He is sceptical of China’s image as a “peace negotiator” in Ukraine, noting Western doubts and pointing to Chinese-origin drone technologies potentially being used by Russia, which he sees as an opportunity for Beijing to test capabilities relevant to future contingencies such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. Regarding Xi Jinping’s engagement with Donald Trump, Kwok describes Trump’s tactics as intentionally unpredictable and places China in a defensive, reactive position at the negotiating table, under pressure over trade, tariffs and essential minerals. He argues that Xi Jinping no longer accepts China’s role as a mere “global factory”, but seeks to build independent strength in strategic industries like EVs, AI and semiconductors, directly challenging US-led dominance. In his assessment, this structural contest means no short-term resolution is likely, and China faces a major challenge in convincing Western powers that it can be both a constructive security actor and a competitive, autonomous economic power.
[18/06/2025] China’s Financial Opening and Digital Yuan: Strategic Shift Toward a Multipolar Financial Order
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a political analyst from Hong Kong, discussing China’s new financial opening measures, the development of the digital yuan, and the country’s strategy to strengthen its financial independence amid rising US–China tensions. The programme explored how Beijing’s selective liberalisation of its financial markets aligns with its long-term goal of reshaping global financial governance and expanding influence across the Global South.
The discussion covered China’s broader efforts to attract non-Western investment, counter US financial dominance, and promote Shanghai and Hong Kong as complementary financial hubs. The conversation also examined the potential benefits of China’s financial opening for foreign businesses, especially from Gulf states and other emerging economies, as well as the challenges facing the digital yuan in achieving international adoption. Issues such as digital sovereignty, geopolitical trust, and the limited global share of the renminbi were highlighted as key obstacles.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China’s financial opening is a calculated strategic move rather than mere economic liberalisation. He explained that Beijing’s threefold strategy aims to attract capital from non-Western partners such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Singapore, reduce reliance on Western financial institutions like the IMF and WTO, and position China as a stable, rule-based financial partner for the Global South. He noted that initiatives such as Middle Eastern sovereign wealth fund investments in Chinese technology and finance reflect a growing alignment beyond Western alliances. On the digital yuan, Lee argued that it serves as a hedging mechanism against US control over global payment systems, especially after the freezing of Russia’s foreign reserves. However, he acknowledged challenges stemming from geopolitical distrust and digital sovereignty concerns. Concluding his remarks, Lee highlighted Shanghai’s role as a rising global financial hub supported by green bond issuances and yuan-denominated oil futures, with Hong Kong acting as a legal and offshore currency partner—together representing China’s dual-centre model for financial modernisation and resilience.
[29/06/2025] China’s Trade Retaliation Warning and Global Supply Chain Implications
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a political analyst from Hong Kong, discussing China’s warning to retaliate against countries that form trade deals with the United States which harm China’s economic interests. The programme explored the broader context of intensifying US–China trade tensions, China’s assertion of economic sovereignty, and the potential consequences for global businesses and supply chains caught between the two major powers.
The discussion covered China’s official statement by its Ministry of Commerce in June 2025, which outlined a firm stance against exclusive trade agreements that damage Chinese interests. It examined the geopolitical and economic implications of this policy, including China’s use of customs delays, export controls, and targeted restrictions as tools of economic deterrence. Examples such as customs backlogs in Shenzhen and Qingdao following the UK–US mini trade deal were cited to illustrate how retaliatory measures affect global trade flows. The conversation also assessed the potential rise in operational costs, regulatory risks, and market uncertainty for multinational companies navigating between Western and Chinese trade blocs.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China’s response reflects a doctrine of strategic deterrence grounded in sovereignty and control, echoing the Sun Tzu principle of “control others, never be controlled”. He explained that Beijing’s actions, including enhanced customs scrutiny and rare earth export restrictions, demonstrate its leverage in global supply chains and its ability to impose costs on states aligning too closely with Washington. Lee highlighted that between April and June 2025, rare earth exports fell by 75 percent, delaying production across industries from electric vehicles to defense. He noted that China perceives US tariffs and sanctions as forms of economic coercion under the guise of national security. While he acknowledged the possibility of renewed dialogue between the two powers, he concluded that Beijing views current negotiations as tactical, preferring incremental “mini deals” with non-Western partners—particularly in Central Asia—over broad accords with the United States, reinforcing its strategy of gradual decoupling and diversification of trade alliances.
[30/06/2025] China–US Agreement Seen as a Step Toward Strategic Stability and Global Market Confidence
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews and featured Dr Marvin Lee, a political analyst from Hong Kong, discussing the implications of the latest agreement between Washington and Beijing on global power dynamics and economic stability. The programme examined how this development may redefine the balance of power in the twenty-first century, highlighting both the potential for cooperation and the persistent tensions shaping the US–China relationship.
The discussion focused on the dual nature of the new China–US agreement, which combines elements of economic security and political reassurance. While the host and other guests reflected on the broader geopolitical impact of this rapprochement, the conversation also assessed which side stands to gain more. The debate underscored that the United States appears to gain immediate advantages from access to China’s rare earth materials vital to high-tech and automotive industries, while China’s benefits are more long-term and strategic.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the United States may see greater short-term economic gains, but China stands to secure deeper strategic benefits. He explained that China views the agreement as an opportunity to stabilise bilateral relations, reopen channels for long-term dialogue, and regain access to advanced technologies crucial for its industrial development. Lee noted that Beijing’s steady institutional system enables it to pursue sustained negotiations aimed at achieving technological cooperation rather than purely transactional outcomes. He emphasised that such engagement, if maintained, could foster broader global stability and market confidence, as coordination between the world’s two largest economies would reduce volatility and benefit international trade. Concluding his remarks, Lee stated that China’s strategic patience and focus on technological advancement align with its long-term vision of balanced coexistence and mutual gain, in contrast to the short-term pressure tactics previously employed under the Trump administration.
May 2025
[08/05/2025] China EU US trade frictions and Saudi diversification intersect with China’s push for AI self reliance
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Al Qahera Al Ikhbariya’s programme Al-Muraqib and featured Dr Mohy El-Din Al-Shuhaimi from the European Commission, Dr Fouad Buwaqri, economic adviser, Dr Rehab El-Rahmawy, an AI and cybersecurity expert, and Marvin Lee, a PhD researcher at the University of Manchester. The discussion examined three linked themes: the European Commission’s move to open tariff talks with the Trump administration, Saudi Arabia’s non-oil economy exceeding half of real GDP under Vision 2030, and China’s call for self-reliance in artificial intelligence amid intensifying US–China competition.
The conversation traced how US tariff policy has strained transatlantic trade and supply chains, prompting Brussels to pursue a negotiated framework while warning of broader geopolitical rifts beyond commerce. It highlighted World Bank warnings about the growth drag from global tariff escalation and turned to the region, where Saudi Arabia’s diversification is advancing through strong finance, insurance and commercial services and deeper industrial cooperation with Egypt. The final segment focused on technology rivalry: China’s leadership framed AI as a strategic domain with opportunities and novel risks, pushing for domestic capability in chips, computing power and applications even as US controls constrain access to advanced components.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China reads the AI contest as part of a wider strategic cycle in which economic security and technological sovereignty must advance together. He argued that Beijing is shifting from dependence on foreign inputs toward indigenous capability—accelerating R&D, backing firms such as Huawei, and building energy and digital infrastructure needed for computation at scale—while accepting that semiconductors remain a principal vulnerability given the lead held by Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Drawing on a Confucian lens of harmony and balance, he framed China’s approach as flexible rather than confrontational: reduce friction where possible, diversify partnerships across the Gulf and ASEAN, and turn external pressure into incentives for long-term upgrading. He concluded that China’s AI self-reliance drive is intended to hedge against US export controls, stabilise supply chains, and position the country for strategic resilience without closing the door to selective cooperation.
[25/05/2025] Trilateral ASEAN GCC China summit framed as pragmatic platform for diversification and regional balance
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on QNews on the programme The World East and featured Gareth Liew Zi a research fellow in Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Malaya, Norman Sam a Malaysian political analyst from Penang, and Marvin Lee of the University of Manchester, discussing the aims and implications of an unprecedented trilateral summit bringing together ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and China amid global trade turbulence and shifting geopolitical alignments. The programme examined whether the meeting signals a move toward a formal trade bloc or a flexible cooperation framework focused on shared priorities such as technology, climate action, and infrastructure.
The discussion covered the summit’s immediate purpose as a coordination platform rather than a binding economic pact, with Liew emphasizing workstreams around digitalisation, climate initiatives, and connectivity to strengthen supply chain resilience. Norman highlighted Malaysia’s interests as ASEAN chair, including semiconductor capacity, market diversification beyond the United States and China, and Malaysia’s bid to project diplomatic leadership on regional security issues. Speakers explored obstacles to a broad ASEAN–GCC free trade agreement, noting heterogeneous economic structures, divergent trade policies, and external security considerations. They also assessed how renewed US tariff policies under Trump-era framing could push ASEAN states to deepen intra-Asian and Gulf ties, expand free trade arrangements, move up the value chain in electronics and green tech, and use Malaysia’s chairmanship in 2025 to press for greater ASEAN cohesion.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the trilateral format aligns with China’s strategy to consolidate a multipolar economic architecture by knitting together energy security from the Gulf with manufacturing depth and market scale in ASEAN. He framed the timing as strategically advantageous given global uncertainty, citing robust China–GCC trade, ASEAN’s growing links with major partners, and Beijing’s intent to broaden cooperation under a collective umbrella rather than a patchwork of purely bilateral deals. In a Confucian register of harmony over domination, Lee argued that China seeks to reduce frictions while diversifying partnerships, using soft power and pragmatic economic initiatives to balance the sharper edges of great-power rivalry. He concluded that the summit offers Beijing a structured way to deepen regional influence and resilience without forcing alignment choices, advancing a long-term logic of stability through interdependence.
April 2025
[05/04/2025] The Escalation of the US–China Trade War
Marvin Lee
The interview featured Marvin Lee, a Hong Kong–based geopolitical analyst and PhD researcher at the University of Manchester, discussing the sharp escalation of US tariffs on Chinese goods to 104% and China’s retaliatory measures. The programme examined whether the renewed trade confrontation signals a new phase of economic decoupling or a broader power struggle between the world’s two largest economies.
The discussion covered how Washington’s move represents the most aggressive form of tariff escalation since the first trade war in 2018, with Beijing’s response—tariffs of 84% on US goods—framed as a clear strategic red line rather than a mere economic reaction. Lee noted that China has turned external pressure into technological progress and diversification, citing Huawei and Xiaomi’s expansion from smartphones to electric vehicles as examples. He explained that the current standoff connects to other flashpoints, including the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the TikTok dispute, the South China Sea, and Taiwan, forming part of a single geopolitical chessboard. The conversation also explored China’s complaint to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the global economic risks of escalating tariffs, and how supply chains might shift toward Southeast Asia and Latin America.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that the trade war has moved beyond economics into a symbolic contest of resilience and influence. He described Beijing’s approach as one of “pressure into progress”, maintaining firm retaliation while reinforcing global partnerships. Quoting classical Chinese wisdom, Lee said China would not “relinquish castles” or make unilateral concessions, highlighting its readiness to respond intelligently rather than impulsively. He argued that WTO mechanisms are structurally biased due to Western dominance, so Beijing relies on direct negotiation and alternative frameworks instead. On technology, he interpreted the TikTok dispute as a bargaining chip in broader diplomatic negotiations rather than a standalone issue, and he dismissed former President Trump’s claims of “permanent tariffs” as tactical brinkmanship. Lee concluded that China’s strategy remains grounded in long-term adaptability, using adversity to strengthen domestic innovation, expand the Global South network, and assert its role as a central actor in shaping the next phase of global economic governance.
[09/04/2025] Rising US–China Trade Tensions and the Long-Term Risk of Economic and Security Confrontation
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an Arabic-language economic news programme and featured Benny Kwok, a political economy researcher speaking via Zoom from Hong Kong, discussing whether China and the United States are on the brink of a full-scale trade war. The programme examined China’s declared readiness for a “trade war,” the political and economic constraints on Beijing’s response, and the wider implications for global trade, supply chains, and future geopolitical stability.
The discussion covered whether current escalatory rhetoric is genuine preparation for confrontation or a bargaining tactic before a negotiated compromise. Kwok argued that a US–China trade war is already a real and emerging possibility, driven by Donald Trump’s escalating tariffs and pressure on Beijing, and by China’s political system, which makes visible concessions difficult. He outlined likely short-term Chinese responses, such as allowing some depreciation of the renminbi and offering limited, face-saving concessions via Hong Kong, including selectively opening certain assets or sectors to US investors, so these moves can be framed domestically as controlled, tactical adjustments rather than major retreats. Over the medium term, he suggested China may expand market access for US goods and services and encourage a partial reduction of US tariffs, while trying to dissuade Washington from pressuring third countries to impose additional duties on Chinese products. At the global level, he emphasised that sustained trade tensions are already encouraging companies to diversify production and supply chains away from China to locations such as India, other parts of Asia, the United States, and Canada, with international firms seeking to reduce geopolitical risk exposure.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that the deeper US–China clash is structural and long-term, extending far beyond tariffs. He stressed that Washington increasingly views China as a comprehensive threat, not only economically but also politically, to US influence worldwide, and therefore he sees little realistic hope of a fundamental improvement in bilateral relations in the foreseeable future. In his analysis, even if China makes targeted concessions to avoid an immediate crisis, the underlying trajectory points toward strategic rivalry, with rising risks of localized military confrontation, particularly in the South China Sea or around Taiwan, as a possible way for leaders to divert attention from domestic economic problems. On the global economy, he warned that if the two largest economies fully enter a trade war, the impact would include fragmented supply chains, higher uncertainty, and accelerated “de-risking” or partial decoupling, though diversification of production across multiple countries could gradually reduce the vulnerability of global supply networks to a single bilateral shock. He concluded that investors, policymakers, and ordinary citizens alike should factor in a persistently elevated risk of US–China conflict—economic and potentially military—over the next five to ten years and beyond, even if no one openly seeks a full-scale war.
[11/04/2025] US Tariffs, TikTok Leverage, and NATO Strains: Geopolitics at a Crossroads
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Q News and featured Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst from Hong Kong, and Camila Zradich Romanovska, an EU law and security studies professor from Brussels, discussing the effectiveness and geopolitical fallout of US tariffs on Chinese imports (reported at 54%) and their linkage to issues such as TikTok, NATO cohesion, and European strategic autonomy. The programme explored the broader US–China trade confrontation, its spillovers into transatlantic relations, and implications for multilateral rules and security alliances.
The discussion covered whether tariffs can coerce policy concessions and how they intersect with WTO disciplines—including Most-Favoured-Nation (Article I) and national security exceptions (Article XXI)—amid the use of IEEPA (1977) as a domestic legal basis in the US. It highlighted concerns over “transactional diplomacy” that ties tariff relief to specific deeds (e.g., data governance and ownership changes for TikTok) and the risk of policy volatility and copycat tactics by other states. Romanovska argued that such measures strain NATO unity, complicate calls to raise defence spending (up to 5% of GDP), and undermine predictability, legal certainty, and mutual respect in international affairs. The conversation also addressed European responses—from semiconductor investment and screening of sensitive foreign investment to a push for strategic autonomy—and warned of higher consumer prices, job losses in trade-exposed sectors, pressure on humanitarian budgets, and potential trade-war escalation impacting fragile regions.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China is strategically resilient and plays a long-term game, contrasting with what he characterises as US short-termism, a framing rooted in Chinese historical perspective and pragmatic statecraft. He contends China has prepared for tariff pressure by diversifying markets (Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, South America), moving up the value chain (e.g., Chinese firms expanding from smartphones into EVs), and reducing exposure to the US (citing a decline in the US share of imports from China since 2016). He emphasises the Dual Circulation Strategy—internal circulation to boost domestic demand and self-reliance in critical technologies (AI, drones, EVs, microchips, and domestic aircraft programmes) and external circulation to uphold trade and investment via initiatives like the Belt and Road—supported by R&D intensification and supply-chain diversification. Lee adds that China is preparing for worst-case scenarios, including potential wartime contingencies, and therefore Trump-era tariffs are unlikely to weaken China’s global economic influence. On the US side, he describes a “transactional diplomacy” that links tariffs to geopolitical swaps (from TikTok to conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Taiwan), warning this approach breeds uncertainty and could proliferate, yet may also invite deal-making that reshapes near-term dynamics.
[22/04/2025] Iran’s Nuclear Talks Entwine with China–Russia Ties amid a Shifting Multipolar Order
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on AlQahera News (القاهرة الإخبارية) and featured John Ross Mound, a national security analyst from Washington, and Dr. Marvin Lee, a political/geopolitical analyst from Hong Kong, discussing Iran’s nuclear negotiations and the expanding web of ties between Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow. The programme explored the complex regional and great-power context shaping upcoming Tehran–Washington talks, including sanctions dynamics, energy security, and multipolar diplomacy.
The discussion covered how China and Russia’s involvement raises Tehran’s leverage by providing diplomatic and political cover that complicates US unilateral pressure. From the US perspective, Mound argued that Beijing’s economic–energy links with Iran and Moscow’s security interactions (including Iranian drones for Russia) create shared interests in maintaining the current pressure architecture while securing oil flows and access to Iran’s economy. The conversation highlighted Beijing’s interests in energy security, Belt and Road cooperation (in telecoms, military tech, and AI), and sanctions evasion pathways, as well as China’s positioning as a regional mediator (e.g., Saudi–Iran rapprochement) to underscore a multipolar order. It also addressed Western pressure on Tehran, Iran’s internal constraints, and the tactical prolongation of talks as some sanctions sunset. Looking ahead, both guests noted that a tight China–Russia–Iran alignment could reshape negotiating dynamics, with higher stakes for regional stability and US policy options.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that Beijing and Moscow now sit effectively on Tehran’s side of the table, using combined diplomatic cover to deter US dominance and reframe the talks within a multipolar logic. He adopts an analytical, strategy-first tone, invoking a Chinese philosophical lens on deterrence and long-horizon statecraft, and argues that China wields influence without direct confrontation, preferring mediation and incremental gain (“winning without war”) while securing vital oil supplies and building Dual-Use cooperation under Belt and Road. Lee outlines five core drivers of Beijing’s engagement: potential civil–nuclear cooperation within UN rules, Iran’s pivotal position on the geopolitical chessboard (linking Taiwan/South China Sea theatres to Middle East balances), energy security via sustained Middle Eastern crude, BRI-linked technology and defense collaboration (including AI and cyber), and coordinated workarounds to US sanctions. He adds that China presents itself as a mediator to project multipolar legitimacy, contrasting US “hegemony” with Chinese partnership. On Iran’s calculus, Lee asserts that Tehran seeks Chinese and Russian backing as strategic insurance, even suggesting that pursuit of nuclear-weapons capability as bargaining leverage is viewed by Tehran as a central power asset, with Beijing and Moscow providing the only national-power scale to counterbalance Washington. He concludes that shared opposition to US pressure and transactional alignments among Iran, China, and Russia are likely to intensify uncertainty while strengthening Tehran’s hand in the next rounds of talks.
[28/04/2025] EU–US Tariff Talks, Saudi Non-Oil Surge, and China’s AI Self-Reliance: A Snapshot of Shifting Economic Power
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on AlQahera News (القاهرة الإخبارية) in the programme Al-Muraqib (The Monitor), hosted by Dina Salem, and featured Dr. Mohyeddin Al-Shohaimi (advisor linked to the European Commission), Dr. Fouad Amin Buwaqri (economic adviser), Dr. Rehab Al-Rahmawy (AI and cybersecurity expert), and Marvin Lee (political-economy/China analyst from Hong Kong), discussing trade frictions with the United States, Saudi Arabia’s non-oil growth, and China’s push for AI self-sufficiency. The programme explored how US–EU tariff tensions, GCC diversification, and US–China technology rivalry intersect in a volatile global economy.
The discussion covered the European Commission’s move toward a dialogue with President Donald Trump after the United States imposed 25% tariffs on EU autos/steel/aluminium and an additional 20% on other goods, later halved with a 90-day window to seek a comprehensive trade deal by 8 July, highlighting risks to transatlantic supply chains, consumer prices, and WTO-consistent rules. It also addressed World Bank warnings about the drag from sweeping tariffs on global growth and urged developing countries to reach trade arrangements with Washington to contain spillovers. Turning to the Gulf, guests noted that Saudi Arabia’s non-oil sectors now exceed 50% of real GDP, with Q2-2024 non-oil growth near 5% and finance/insurance/commercial services above 7%, crediting Vision 2030, FDI attraction, mining, and the Public Investment Fund. In technology, the programme examined President Xi Jinping’s call for AI self-reliance, framing AI as a strategic contest with the United States amid export controls and chip-supply constraints, and debated the pace of Chinese substitution in semiconductors, infrastructure, and dual-use applications, alongside opportunities and systemic risks.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China treats AI as a pillar of long-horizon national power, linking it to a broader economic-security strategy shaped by the US–China trade war. He argues that Beijing is pursuing self-reliance through state-backed R&D, domestic chip innovation, and industrial deployment by national champions (e.g., Huawei, Xiaomi) across devices, robotics, and defense-adjacent systems, while diversifying markets to blunt US tariffs and export controls. Drawing on a Chinese strategic lens of deterrence and endurance, he frames policy as “win without war”—absorbing sanctions, re-architecting supply chains, and building energy-intensive AI infrastructure to sustain scale. Lee highlights semiconductors as the core vulnerability, given Taiwan/Japan/South Korea advantages and US restrictions on advanced GPUs, but contends that iterative domestic breakthroughs and ecosystem investment are closing gaps. He concludes that Washington can slow but not stop China’s trajectory; AI self-sufficiency, embedded within a long-term, Confucian-inflected emphasis on resilience and gradualism, will reduce dependence on US technology, raise Beijing’s bargaining power, and intensify a transactional, uncertain phase in trade and tech relations.
March 2025
[23/03/2025] US–China “Minerals War” Reshapes Tech, Trade, and Security Calculus
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on Q News in the programme In Depth and featured Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst from Hong Kong, and Inna Toskerman, a national security analyst from New York, discussing the escalating competition over critical minerals—rare earths, lithium, graphite, gallium, germanium, and related inputs—and how this contest is redefining industrial policy, supply chains, and geopolitical leverage between China and the United States.
The discussion covered China’s entrenched dominance in processing and refining—with claims of around 80% of global rare-earth processing and 60–70% of lithium refining—and Beijing’s use of targeted export controls (gallium, germanium, antimony) as geopolitical tools. It examined Washington’s response via tariffs, wartime authorities under the Defense Production Act, permitting fast-tracks, and alliances such as a minerals security partnership to diversify away from Chinese supply, alongside efforts to onshore semiconductor capacity and expand access in resource-rich states (DRC, Zambia, Angola, Morocco, Ukraine). The guests highlighted knock-on effects for EVs, clean energy, semiconductors, and defense systems, the risk of supply-chain disruption, and the time lag (10–15 years) to convert new deposits into reliable production, even under an expanded US industrial strategy. They also noted how the Russia–Ukraine war has reconfigured supply chains, at times benefiting China through gaps left by sanctions on Russian metals and Western shortfalls in mining/refining capacity.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China treats critical minerals as strategic sinews of power under “Made in China 2025” and “new-quality productivity”, using processing control to anchor technology leadership and diplomatic leverage. He argues—through an analytical, long-horizon lens resonant with Chinese statecraft—that Beijing’s selective export curbs both protect national security and signal capability to shape global industries (EVs, smartphones, defense), citing the 2010 rare-earth pressure on Japan and the Baotou (Inner Mongolia) hub as proof of toolkit credibility. Lee acknowledges risks—international backlash, accelerated diversification by the US/EU/Australia/Canada, and recycling breakthroughs—but contends these are manageable near term given regulatory and capacity hurdles in the West, leaving China with a negotiating edge. He frames Trump-era tariffs as Cold War 2.0 instruments that justify Chinese counter-measures, and points to outbound investments (e.g., BYD/CATL in the Lithium Triangle and new projects in Peru) as part of a global hedging strategy. He concludes that calibrated restrictions plus overseas securing of feedstocks will sustain China’s upper hand, while a Confucian-inflected emphasis on prudence and endurance guides Beijing’s balancing of leverage with economic self-interest.
Feb 2025
[02/02/2025] China’s Calculus on the Philippines’ Missile Offer and the South China Sea
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on an Arabic news programme and featured Marvin Lee, a geopolitical analyst from Hong Kong, discussing Beijing’s response to a reported Philippine offer to remove a missile system and whether China would trade concessions for de-escalation in the South China Sea. The programme explored the legal–historical claims, deterrence dynamics, and crisis-management channels shaping current tensions.
The discussion covered China’s stated sovereignty posture over the South China Sea, its emphasis on deterrence and escalation control, and limited readiness to compromise where core interests are not affected. It highlighted risk-reduction with Manila to avoid maritime incidents, coordination along maritime boundaries, and the linkage to cross-Strait dynamics with Taiwan. It also noted the Philippine military’s deployments and the need for practical cooperation mechanisms to prevent future crises, even as both sides seek to signal resolve.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China could accept tactical concessions—including responding positively to removal of a Philippine missile system—only if such steps do not impinge on Beijing’s claimed sovereignty or security prerogatives. In a measured, analytical tone, he frames Beijing’s stance through a Chinese strategic lens of long-term planning and deterrence, pairing offers of dialogue with maintained military readiness in the South China Sea and vis-à-vis Taiwan. Drawing on Chinese historical and legal narratives and a Confucian preference for stability, he argues that narrow, reversible trade-offs are acceptable to de-risk confrontation, but China will not yield on what it defines as core interests; any accommodation is therefore calibrated, conditional, and aimed at preventing escalation while preserving strategic leverage.
Nov 2024
[24/11/2024] China’s Outreach to Singapore: Strategic Signalling, Technology Ties, and Regional Influence
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on an Arabic news programme (channel not stated) and featured Marvin Lee, discussing China’s objectives behind initiating a high-profile visit to Singapore. The programme explored the broader regional and economic context of China–Singapore relations within Southeast Asian finance, technology, and diplomacy.
The discussion covered China’s intention to reinforce bilateral ties with Singapore, leveraging deep historical and diaspora links, while showcasing economic solidarity and cooperation. It highlighted Beijing’s use of Singapore as a trusted diplomatic interlocutor to signal stability across Asia, expand financial connectivity, and anchor technology collaboration tied to industrial upgrading and AI-driven sectors. The segment also situated the visit within China’s regional strategy to consolidate influence and broaden partnerships beyond a single capital, underlining continuity in geopolitical projects alongside pragmatic economic deliverables.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that Beijing seeks concrete payoffs on three fronts: (1) strengthening political trust and economic integration with Singapore, (2) scaling cooperation in technology—especially under initiatives akin to Made in China 2025 and AI ecosystems—and (3) amplifying China’s regional voice through a credible, market-savvy hub. He frames the visit through a Chinese long-term strategic lens—patient statecraft, balance-of-power management, and “win-win” signaling—noting that diaspora ties help legitimize deeper engagement. Drawing implicitly on a Confucian preference for stability and harmony, he argues that calibrated economic partnerships (finance, advanced manufacturing, AI) serve geopolitical aims without overt confrontation. He concludes that China will offer visible cooperation while guarding core interests, using Singapore’s financial and technological strengths to project influence and de-risk regional frictions, thereby advancing Beijing’s strategic position.
Oct 2024
[24/10/2024] International Mediation and Power Shifts: Lebanon’s Crisis Through a BRICS–West Lens
Marvin Lee
The interview aired on an international news channel and featured Marvin Lee, an expert from the Department of Geopolitical Analyses in Hong Kong, discussing the escalating tensions in Lebanon amid parallel diplomacy at the BRICS summit and an international conference in Paris. The programme explored how multilateral statements, humanitarian aid pledges, and great-power positioning could shape ceasefire prospects and conflict dynamics.
The discussion covered competing mediation tracks—with BRICS (notably China) presenting superficial joint statements alongside claims of a broader peace-brokering role, while the EU/G7 emphasize humanitarian assistance. It highlighted US shuttle diplomacy—the Secretary of State’s 11th regional tour—as an attempt to engineer a ceasefire, yet constrained by US domestic politics and election-year uncertainty. The segment framed Lebanon’s crisis as part of a wider “Cold War 2.0” proxy competition between BRICS and the West, noting that national interests often override immediate de-escalation. Looking ahead, it considered whether balance-of-power shifts might occur as BRICS expands, concluding that short-term change is limited, but long-term rebalancing is plausible.
Marvin Lee’s viewpoint is that China sees itself as a credible mediator capable of advancing ceasefire efforts—citing Beijing’s role in the 2023 Saudi–Iran rapprochement and a 2024 Palestinian reconciliation statement—and that humanitarian pledges alone are unlikely to halt violence quickly. He argues, in an analytical, long-horizon tone, that the conflict is embedded in a BRICS–West strategic contest, with states pursuing core interests first. Drawing on a Chinese/Confucian preference for stability, harmony, and “winning hearts and minds,” Lee contends that China’s patient diplomacy and non-military tools position it to incrementally shape outcomes, whereas US electoral politics limit Washington’s leverage. He concludes that near-term de-escalation is uncertain, but China’s sustained, long-game mediation could tilt the long-term balance modestly in Beijing’s favor while keeping military escalation in check.
Oct 2023
[03/10/2025] A Decade On, China’s Belt and Road Faces Mounting Financial and Geopolitical Pressures
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an Arabic-language programme and featured Benny Kwok, a political economy researcher from Hong Kong, discussing the key obstacles facing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ten years after its launch. The conversation explored the initiative’s evolving challenges, particularly as China’s domestic economic conditions shift and global geopolitical competition intensifies.
The discussion outlined the dual pressures limiting the BRI’s expansion. On one hand, the programme highlighted the slowdown in China’s economy, rising financial constraints, and concerns surrounding the sustainability of large-scale overseas infrastructure funding. On the other, it examined growing Western resistance to the BRI, particularly criticisms that Chinese lending creates debt vulnerabilities in developing countries. The interview also referenced cases where recipient states struggled to repay Chinese loans, fuelling perceptions of strategic overreach and increasing scrutiny from international actors.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that the BRI’s most significant challenge is China’s own economic deceleration, which limits Beijing’s ability to mobilise the extensive capital required for infrastructure-led development abroad. He emphasised that the initiative relies heavily on state-backed financing, construction firms, and domestic industrial capacity, meaning weaker domestic demand and shrinking financial space directly constrain China’s outward investment ambitions. Kwok also underscored the second major obstacle: Western containment efforts, including narratives about “debt traps” and fears that China leverages lending as political influence. These dynamics, he argued, have pressured several developing countries and complicated China’s international positioning. He concluded that the combination of internal financial strain and external geopolitical pushback represents the core challenge to the BRI’s future trajectory, even as Beijing continues to seek markets, partners, and strategic access through the initiative.
Sept 2023
[01/09/2023] China and Russia’s Alignment and the Contest over a Multipolar World Order
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on the current affairs programme Madar Al-Ghad and featured Caroline Rose from Washington, Benny Kwok from Beijing, and Russian political scientist Stanislav Bishok from Moscow. The discussion examined how Russia’s war in Ukraine, together with deepening Russian–Chinese coordination, is reshaping debates over a multipolar world order and challenging the US-led international system. The programme focused on whether Moscow and Beijing can successfully weaken American hegemony, how the war has transformed European security (including Finland and Sweden’s NATO bids and German rearmament), and who might ultimately lead any alternative global pole.
The discussion explored Western concerns that Russia is using the Ukraine war to justify a new, “more just” multipolar system, while the United States insists on defending principles such as territorial integrity and sovereignty and warns that allowing Russia to keep Ukrainian territory would set a dangerous precedent. Caroline Rose argued that Washington seeks to preserve a rules-based order and sees the war as a test case for deterring future aggression. From Moscow, Stanislav Bishok stressed that the Kremlin presents the conflict as a civilisational struggle over the shape of the international system, not just a territorial dispute, while also acknowledging that Russia was unprepared for a long war and that the campaign reflects Vladimir Putin’s personal choices more than the Russian public’s will. The guests debated the risks of escalation among major powers, the historical record of multi-polar vs. bipolar systems, and what the United States and Europe stand to lose if US unipolar dominance erodes, including their ability to enforce norms and constrain other states’ revisionist ambitions.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that China is tactically exploiting Russia’s war and gradual weakening to position itself as the real leader of a future non-Western pole, while avoiding direct confrontation with the West. He argues that Beijing sees no realistic path for a Russian military victory in Ukraine, and therefore uses the situation to tighten Russian dependence on China, especially in energy, payments, and sanctions evasion, and to strengthen its own influence in the Global South, notably via BRICS expansion and outreach to developing countries. Kwok emphasises that China publicly claims neutrality but in practice sides with Russia, leveraging the war to portray itself as the champion of the developing world and as a key alternative to Western power. In his assessment, Russia cannot credibly lead a rival pole due to its limited and resource-dependent economy, military setbacks, and shrinking share of global GDP, whereas China combines scale, industrial capacity, technology, and a vast domestic market, giving it the structural advantages to anchor a new centre of power. He concludes that China’s long-term strategy is to ride Russia’s relative decline, avoid Western sanctions, and gradually emerge as the primary leader of any counter-hegemonic bloc challenging US and Western dominance.
Aug 2023
[06/08/2023] China, the Philippines and the US: Signalling, Deterrence and the Battle for Influence in the South China Sea
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an Arabic-language current affairs programme and featured Benny Kwok, an international policy expert from Hong Kong, alongside Prof. Young Kim, a visiting professor from Washington, and a Latin American researcher in international relations speaking from Buenos Aires. The discussion focused on escalating tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, examining whether recent incidents reflect a deliberate, managed escalation and how US–Philippines security ties and China’s assertive maritime claims are reshaping regional stability and power dynamics.
The guests discussed whether the latest clashes at sea represent intentional signalling or simple tactical friction. The Buenos Aires analyst argued that tensions are likely to increase over time, as China uses its coast guard and maritime presence to respond forcefully to Philippine activities in strategically vital waters near major trade routes and close to Taiwan, while neighbouring states seek closer ties with the United States and Japan to hedge against Chinese expansion. From Washington, Prof. Kim stressed that US policy is driven by concerns over China’s attempts to dominate the South China Sea and disregard international legal rulings, noting that Washington is supporting allies such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei and backing them diplomatically and militarily within the framework of the 1951 US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. He emphasised that both Washington and Beijing wish to avoid a direct war, but that US forward deployments, bases and defence cooperation are intended to deter Chinese coercion and to reassure regional partners. Overall, the programme framed the situation as a slow-moving strategic contest, in which US military presence, regional alliances and Chinese maritime pressure generate a pattern of reciprocal “messages” and counter-messages short of open conflict.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that this is not a passing flare-up but a calibrated and growing confrontation, with China using the South China Sea to send firm deterrent signals to both the Philippines and the wider region. He argues that Beijing views recent Philippine actions and closer US–Japan–Philippines coordination as challenges to what China regards as its non-negotiable historical rights and sovereignty over key islands and waters. In his analysis, China’s strategy blends hard power and economic leverage: the Chinese coast guard and maritime forces are used to warn Manila that relying on US backing has costs, while China’s position as the leading economic partner for many Southeast Asian states makes these countries reluctant to jeopardise ties with Beijing. Kwok stresses that China and the US are locked in a long-term strategic rivalry, but are likely to fight it through partners and proxy frictions—with the South China Sea becoming a primary arena—rather than through direct large-scale war. He notes that Washington is working systematically to narrow China’s diplomatic space in Southeast Asia by deepening military, economic and political links with states like the Philippines and Vietnam, while Beijing relies on its market size and regional trade centrality rather than reassurance to keep neighbours from aligning too closely with Washington. Kwok concludes that Southeast Asian states do not want a US–China war, but will remain caught in a balancing game, as China insists on its maritime claims and the US quietly builds up alliances and deterrence around those same contested waters.
June 2023
[17/06/2023] Escalating Cyber Tensions Between the United States and China
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an Arabic news channel and featured Michael (a U.S.-based political science professor), Sarar Hoshiar (a cybersecurity expert), and Benny Kwok, an international politics analyst from Hong Kong, discussing the intensifying U.S.–China cyber confrontation. The programme examined recent U.S. intelligence assessments accusing China of extensive cyber-espionage operations and the broader geopolitical backdrop of deteriorating bilateral relations, growing military competition in the Pacific, and mutual accusations of covert cyber activities.
The discussion covered the mounting U.S. allegations that China is conducting wide-scale cyber intrusions targeting government agencies, critical infrastructure, and sensitive communications. Other segments explored the difficulty of attributing cyberattacks to states, the role of independent or criminal hacking groups, the “Five Eyes” intelligence warnings, and China’s counter-claim that it is a primary victim rather than an aggressor. The guests also addressed related themes such as the evolution of hybrid warfare, the vulnerabilities of even technologically advanced countries like the United States, and the strategic dilemma faced by middle-power and Arab states when choosing between American and Chinese technological ecosystems.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that both the United States and China are actively expanding their cyber-capabilities as part of a broader strategic rivalry marked by mistrust, deteriorating diplomacy, and efforts to weaken each other’s technological advantages. He emphasised that China is likely to intensify its cyber operations, drawing on state-linked institutions including elements associated with the PLA and civilian entities with close government ties. Kwok framed the situation as part of an ongoing “hybrid” and “unrestricted” competition in which each side seeks leverage—not only through physical military power but through information disruption, communications sabotage, and the spreading of misleading narratives to influence decision-making. He concluded that upcoming diplomatic engagements, such as Secretary Blinken’s visit to Beijing, are unlikely to ease tensions, portraying China’s response as a strategic test of U.S. intentions and a probing of Washington’s willingness to stabilise or recalibrate the bilateral relationship.
[21/06/2023] China’s Strategic Signalling in Cuba and the US Sphere of Influence
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on AlQahera News on the programme File of the Day and featured Dr Ahmed Sayed Ahmed from Cairo, Irina Soberman from New York, Dr Isabel Frangieh from Caracas and Benny Kwok, an international relations expert speaking from Hong Kong, discussing China’s growing security and economic presence in Cuba and Latin America and its impact on US national security and global power competition. The programme explored the reported Chinese military training facility and electronic intelligence activities in Cuba, set against the backdrop of escalating US China rivalry and the historical sensitivity of Cuba as the US “backyard.”
The discussion covered US fears of a Chinese security footprint only 100 miles from Florida, the comparison with the Cuban missile crisis, and the broader shift toward a more multipolar international order. Guests highlighted how Washington views Chinese tech and military activity in Cuba as a direct threat to US national security, while Latin American perspectives stressed that decades of US sanctions, pressure and neglect have driven countries like Cuba, Venezuela and others to deepen ties with China and Russia. The conversation also addressed China’s use of economic tools, infrastructure projects and BRICS engagement to expand its influence in the Caribbean and Latin America, and examined whether US policy, including long standing sanctions on Havana, has unintentionally opened space for Beijing to entrench itself in the region.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that China’s reported security cooperation with Cuba is primarily a strategic signal rather than a simple espionage project, reflecting Beijing’s willingness to respond symmetrically to US military and political pressure in East Asia. He argues that China is now a major economic and technological power that the United States increasingly treats as a systemic rival, and that Beijing’s presence in Cuba shows it is not afraid of US hegemony and can operate near US territory just as Washington operates near China around Taiwan and the South China Sea. He noted that China does not necessarily need a Cuban base to spy on the United States in an age of satellites and cyber capabilities, and that the real significance lies in demonstrating resolve, expanding strategic options and signalling that “backyard politics” can work in both directions. He concluded that the Cuba issue should be seen within the broader logic of long term US China strategic competition, where each side tests red lines and balances the other’s influence, rather than as an isolated intelligence story.
Feb 2023
[05/02/2023] Political Motives Behind the Chinese Balloon Incident
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on an Arabic news channel and featured Benny Kwok, alongside American analysts, discussing the diplomatic and political implications of the Chinese high-altitude balloon that entered U.S. airspace. The programme examined how the incident unfolded, how it was framed in U.S. media, and what strategic or political signals may lie behind China’s actions.
The discussion reviewed U.S. reactions, including intense political pressure on the Biden administration, calls by Republican figures and former officials to shoot down the balloon, and Secretary Blinken’s cancellation of his scheduled visit to Beijing. Guests noted that U.S. authorities initially lacked clarity on the balloon’s purpose, and the American side appeared eager to collect and study the debris. The conversation also explored how domestic U.S. politics, media portrayals, and public pressure amplified the incident, transforming it into a symbol of strategic tension rather than merely a technical or surveillance issue.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that China deliberately allowed the balloon to become visible to the United States, anticipating that it would be detected and that Washington would react politically. He argued that China may have been seeking to provoke a political dilemma for President Biden, generating internal pressure within the U.S. and complicating its diplomatic posture. Kwok emphasised that the balloon’s purpose may extend beyond mere surveillance, suggesting it carries political and strategic signalling value rather than purely military intent. He framed the incident as a light, indirect form of strategic pressure—an example of China using non-traditional, low-intensity tools to test U.S. responses and to advance its broader geopolitical objectives without crossing into open confrontation.
Jan 2023
[18/01/2023] Managing Rivalry and Preserving Dialogue between the United States and China
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on the Asharq News channel, within the Riyadh based programme الرابط (Al Rabit), and featured Benny Kwok, alongside a former US diplomat and European and regional economic experts, discussing how the United States and China can manage deep strategic tensions while preserving economic and diplomatic cooperation. The programme used the upcoming visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Beijing, recent high level economic contacts, and ongoing geopolitical crises as a lens to examine whether the two powers can build a stable framework for competition without sliding into open confrontation.
The discussion covered key files expected on the table in Beijing, including Ukraine, Taiwan, semiconductor and technology restrictions, and global economic risks such as inflation, supply chain disruptions, and the slowdown in Chinese growth. Guests highlighted that, despite recurring tensions and talk of decoupling, trade between the two economies reached around 760 billion dollars, and China’s post Covid reopening is seen as a potential support factor for global growth. The programme also examined US China competition in Africa, contrasting Beijing’s infrastructure and financing driven approach under initiatives such as Belt and Road with Washington’s emphasis on democracy, governance, and diversified supply chains, as well as the implications of the Saudi Chinese summit and investment announcements for the broader international balance. Throughout, the presenters returned to the central question of whether structured dialogue, mutual respect, and clear red lines on Taiwan can provide a foundation to manage rivalry rather than escalate it into crisis.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that China is cautiously repositioning itself in this phase, seeking to protect its economic interests and international image while avoiding secondary sanctions and excessive entanglement in the Russia Ukraine war. He argued that Beijing keeps a calculated distance from the conflict, both to shield major Chinese companies from US and Western penalties and because the war’s catastrophic consequences weaken a key partner, Russia, and thus require China to prepare for a possible erosion of Russian power and its impact on future triangular relations with Washington and Moscow. On Taiwan, Kwok stressed that Beijing sees the island as a core political foundation and red line in relations with the United States and believes Washington is using the Taiwan issue as a strategic card, particularly through high profile visits and political signalling, which China answers with military manoeuvres but calibrated restraint to avoid uncontrolled escalation. He described US policy under President Biden as a mix of “soft diplomacy and hard competition”, maintaining many of the Trump era economic and technological pressures while attempting to reopen channels and manage crises. Regarding China’s sudden abandonment of the zero Covid policy, Kwok noted that the abrupt reopening, ordered from the top in an authoritarian system, caused a surge in infections and deaths and contributed to global supply chain disruptions, but he underlined that Beijing is now trying to reset its domestic economy, reopen borders, and repair external ties. On the Saudi Chinese summit, he assessed that the visit carries greater strategic meaning for Saudi Arabia than for China, signalling Riyadh’s desire to diversify partnerships, while for Beijing it fits into a wider pattern of pragmatic engagement without replacing the US role. Overall, he portrayed the Blinken visit and parallel economic contacts as part of a mutual attempt to test intentions, stabilise a structurally competitive relationship, and explore limited areas of cooperation rather than a fundamental reset.
[20/01/2023] Evolving U.S.–China Relations Under China’s New Foreign Minister
Benny Kwok
The interview aired on Cairo News (القاهرة الإخبارية) and featured Benny Kwok, a research fellow at a Hong Kong-based policy centre, discussing recent developments in U.S.–China relations. The programme focused on the planned visit of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China in February and the impact of China’s new foreign minister, a former ambassador to Washington, on the future trajectory of bilateral ties between the two powers.
The discussion explored how the appointment of China’s new foreign minister signals a new phase in Beijing’s foreign policy, especially toward the United States, given his prior experience in Washington and his strong economic and diplomatic background. It revisited the historical precedent of “ping-pong diplomacy” in the early 1970s, when sports exchanges helped open a channel between Beijing and Washington, and drew parallels with today’s attempts to manage tension rather than allow relations to break down. The conversation also highlighted how current crises, particularly the war in Ukraine, the Taiwan issue, and disputes over semiconductors and advanced technology, are reshaping the agenda of U.S.–China dialogue and influencing the global strategic environment.
Benny Kwok’s viewpoint is that the new Chinese foreign minister’s appointment reflects Beijing’s intention to recalibrate and actively manage its relationship with Washington, placing greater emphasis on pragmatic economic interests and structured diplomatic engagement. He argues that this personnel change indicates an adjustment in China’s posture toward the United States, with expectations of gradual evolution in ties over the coming year, despite persistent tensions. Kwok situates this within a longer historical arc—from Cold War coordination against the Soviet Union, through the post–Soviet era, to today’s landscape shaped by the Ukraine conflict and high-tech competition—and contends that both countries, as major global powers, must find ways to manage deterioration rather than allow confrontation to spiral. He stresses that Taiwan and the Ukraine war will be the central items on the February agenda, noting that China seeks to end the Ukraine war through mediation and persuasion of Russia, but not necessarily in the manner preferred by the United States, insisting instead on a “rational” approach that balances China’s relations with Russia, the U.S., and Ukraine while contributing to a broader, durable settlement.
